A bidder's strategy in one auction may affect his competitors' behavior in subsequent auctions. When this occurs, bidding in a sequence of auctions can be modeled fruitfully as a multistage control process. This paper presents such a model. In it the control is the bidder's strategy, the state characterizes the competitors' behavior and the state transition represents the competitors' reaction to the bidder's strategy. Dynamic programming is used to derive the infinite horizon optimal bidding strategy. We show that in steady state this optimal strategy generalizes a previous result for equilibrium bidding strategy in 'one-shot' auctions.
MUCH of the theory of competitive bidding and all of the early developments in that theory dealt with 'one-shot' situations, that is, bidding situations in which it is appropriate for the bidder to attempt to maximize his expected profit from the present auction or simultaneous group of auctions. Recently, a number of models for optimum bidding in sequential auctions have been developed. 1l3,6-8 , [13] [14] [15] All of these deal with the internal effects within the bidding firm of winning or losing auctions. With the exception of a little-known and specialized paper of Banerjee and Ghosh,t2] they all share the assumption that the competition will not react in later auctions to what the bidder has done in earlier auctions (see Note 1). At times this must be a tenuous assumption in a field that is filled with literature suggesting how bidders should use information about the past behavior of competitors to determine their bids in present auctions. Therefore, we have built a model of bidding in sequential auctions in which we assume a bidder's competitors will react to his previous bids.
One possible approach is to model the bidding process as a dynamic multiplayer noncooperative game. This, however, seems difficult. Our approach is less ambitious. We assume that bidders develop a behavioral model of how their competitiors will react. This assumption leads us to 1080 model the sequential bidding problem as a multistage control process, in which the control is the bidder's strategy and the state characterizes the collective behavior of the competitors. In this model tho state transition represents the competitors' reaction to the bidder's policy. We use dynamic programming to derive an equation for the optimal infinite horizon bidding strategy. When this equation is solved for a generalization of a previous model of 'one-shot' auctions,t91 the formula for the optimal oneshot policy is modified by the inclusion of a term that depends upon the magnitude of competitive reaction, the time between auctions, and the discount rate.
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF BIDDING IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
Consider a bidder who faces an infinite sequence of sealed-bid auctions. In each auction his expected profit from that auction depends upon the bidding policy of the rest of the industry and upon his own bidding policy. He would like to choose his own policy to maximize his expected profit from the immediate auction. However, he must keep in mind that his actions in the present auction will be observed by his competitors and will influence their behavior in future auctions. Therefore, it is in his interest to choose a bidding policy that will maximize his expected present value of profits in the present auction and all future auctions. It is this process that we propose to model. Let P (kI) be an n-dimensional vector where n is the total number of bidders and Pi (k), the ith component of P (k), is a scalar representing the bidding policy of the ith bidder in the kth auction. We assume the expected reward of the ith bidder in the kth auction, denoted by Ei (kI), to be a fixed function of P (kI). We can solve this problem usinig dynamic programming. Let 
For notational convenience we shall temporarily omit the subscripts i.
Let P (Q) be the value of P that maximizes the right-hand side of (5) for a given value of Q. Then
V(Q)=E[Q, P(Q)]+DV[f(Q) P(Q))]. (6)
If we assume E (Q, P) and f(Q, P) are differentiable with respect to P,
P (Q) is a stationary point satisfying the necessary condition {[E (Q, P)/aP]+D[dV (t)/dS]t_f(Q,p)af(Q, P)/aP} |P=P(Q) =0
(7) for any given Q.
Substituting t for Q in ( Equation (10) is a necessary condition for the optimal strategy Pi (Qi). According to this strategy, bidder i's optimal policy in any auction will be
Note that PF[Qi (k)] is bidder i's optimal policy given his assumption that the trade's behavior is represented by Qi (k) and (2). This result is true independently of whether bidder i's previous policies were optimal and of whether the trade has followed the assumed reaction function in the past.
OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIUM POLICY FOR IDENTICAL BIDDERS
To obtain more specific results, we now consider the special case of identical bidders, i.e., when fi, Ei, and Di are the same for all i. Conceivably there exists in this case an optimal equilibrium policy P* such that, if all the bidders use this policy, it is optimal for each of them to keep using it. If so, then P, (P* ) = P* for all i. Furthermore, for the reaction function fi to be consistent dynamically with such behavior, it has to satisfy f.(P* P*)=P*. For the policy P* to be a meaningful equilibrium policy, it should be a stable equilibrium in the sense that small deviations from this policy will create incentives that will drive the trade back to equilibrium. This stability condition imposes an additional restriction on the reaction function. 
Since P (P*) = P*, (24) implies that P* is a stable policy if near P* the optimal policy of each bidder deviates from P* less than his estimate of the trade policy. A rigorous proof that this condition is satisfied involves the specific form of the reward function. However, in general, one can expect that if the trade bids very aggressively, bidder i cannot make money in this auction. Thus his optimal strategy will be to lose the bid by bidding very unaggressively. On the other hand, if the trade bids unaggressively, he should do his best to win the bid by bidding more aggressively than the trade. If we assume P is a continuous function, the above implies that as Q increases, P (Q) crosses the line f=Pi from above. Thus its slope at P (P*) = P* is less than unity, as required by condition (24).
A PARTICULAR MODEL
In this section we generalize to the case of sequential auctions some of the results obtained by Rothkopft9' for a one-shot model. Suppose now that the one-shot situation described above recurs at fixed time intervals and that each bidder has to consider the effect of his present bid on his future payoffs. In particular, we shall assume as before that bidder i's objective is to maximize his present value of future rewards with discount factor Di. Clearly, the reward function (25) satisfies condition (1). We also assume the reaction function that is given by (20). Thus the identical bidders' equilibrium policy can be derived from (23) In spite of the possible gap between expected and actual reaction, we believe that the riesults given in equations (28), (29), and (30) provide insight into the effect of competitive reaction on optimal bidding policy and the profit to be paid by bid takers. Observe that the effect of the sequential nature of auctions depends only upon a factor that is the product of a parameter that measures the strength of competitive reaction and a simple function of the discount factor between auctions. Also note that the expected profit of the bidders is a nonlinear function of this factor. This dependence suggests a number of tactics that bid takers can pursue if they suspect that they are paying excessive profits to suppliers because of tacit collusion. They may be able to increase m by reducing the uncertainty the bidders face; increase n by bringing in additional bidders; decrease the discount factor D by increasing the interval between successive auctions; and decrease a by changing institutional factors. These steps might include making it more difficult for the trade to react by keeping the amount of the winning bid secret and by frequently changing the list of invited bidders so that there is usually at least one new bidder present.
The model presented in Section 4 also has a tactical message for bidders. A bidder should restrain his aggressiveness in repetitive bidding situations if he thinks doing so will influence his competitors to behave less aggresssively in the future. Also, a bidder should try to convince his competitors that he will react to their policy changes. 
